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论 文 摘 要 
 
自从 Jensen 和 Meckling（1976）把代理成本的概念引入到资本结构理论研
究中以后，大量的学者从 Berle 和 Means（1932）关于企业所有权与控制权相分
离的命题出发，以美国公众公司为研究对象，探讨掌握公司控制权的管理者在各












































































Since Jensen and Meckling introduced the concept of agency cost into the 
theoretical research on capital structure in 1976, many scholars, using public 
companies in U.S. as research objects, had begun to analyze how managers who 
control those companies choose the capital structure under various circumstances on 
the basis of the proposition of the separation between ownership and control in 
modern corporations, which was brought forward by Berle and Means in 1932. 
However, Shleifer&Vishny(1997) and LLSV(2000) had pointed out that in large 
companies of many countries, the basic agency problem was not the conflict between 
outside investors and managers just as Berle & Means(1932) had found, but the 
conflict between outside investors and controlling shareholders who had almost 
entirely controlled managers. Therefore, under the condition of controlling 
shareholders, the issue of capital structure decisions made by large shareholders under 
different circumstances becomes a more typical research issue. 
This paper chooses public-held companies in China as research objects, and 
systematically analyzes whether controlling shareholders influence companies’ capital 
structure decisions. Especially, this paper investigates how controlling shareholders 
choose capital structure in cases of financing preference, asset substitution and 
resources control. As a result, this paper gets some important findings just as follows: 
Firstly, after considering the endogenesis of ownership structure, the proportion 
of shares held by large shareholders still has effect on capital structure decisions of 
public-held companies. 
Secondly, under the unique dual equity structure in China, large shareholders 
holding large number of non-tradable shares will expropriate minority shareholders 
through equity financing preference. 
Thirdly, because both the law protection and self-preservation of creditors are 
poor currently in China, large shareholders would choose higher debt ratio to take 
asset substitution for the sake of equity, which is the opposite of creditors’ interests. 
Lastly, since the governance role of debt in Chinese public-held companies does 
not work at present, large shareholders would make use of subsidiaries affiliated to 
public-held companies to get more debt financing so that they could control more 













In sum，the above research results indicate that, under the current institutional 
environment of relative poor law protection for investors in China, large shareholders 
will choose corresponding capital structure to expropriate minority shareholders, 
creditors and other outside investors.These findings not only help us to better 
understand and expand the existing theory of capital structure, but also have important 
theoretical and realistic significance for us to improve our public-held companies’ 
governance structure by investigating large shareholders’ behavior and strengthening 
the governance role of debt. 
This paper consists of eight chapters, and the main contents of each chapter are 
outlined as follows: 
Chapter 1 is the introduction, which briefly introduces the research background 
and issues, contents and framework, as well as the contributions of the paper. 
Chapter 2 is the literature review. The paper reviews not only the history 
evolvement and new development of capital structure theory, but also the 
development of theory related to large shareholder governance. And then, based on 
the theory of large shareholder governance, the paper briefly makes a comment on the 
related capital structure research. 
Chapter 3 introduces the institutional background related to China security 
market and public-held companies, including the status quo and international 
comparison of Chinese investor protection, the status quo and international 
comparison of capital structure of Chinese public-held companies, and the status quo 
and international comparison of ownership structure of Chinese public-held 
companies. 
Chapter 4 investigates whether the proportion of shares held by large 
shareholders still has effect on capital structure decisions of public-held companies 
when the endogenesis of ownership structure is considered. 
Chapter 5 investigates when needing external financing, for what motivation and 
how large shareholders holding large number of non-tradable shares choose different 
financing instruments. 
Chapter 6 investigates for the sake of taking asset substitution, for what 
motivation and how large shareholders choose capital structure under the poor law 
protection and self-preservation of creditors. 













control of debt on their control, for what motivation and how large shareholders 
choose capital structure under the condition of poor governance role of debt. 
Chapter 8 sums up the research findings of the paper, including the research 
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